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THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE FIRST
CENTURY OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE
LARGER PICTURE OF ANTITRUST HISTORY
JAMES MAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is particularly appropriate that we pause this morning to consider
the role of the states in the first century of the Sherman Act.' In this
centennial year we find ourselves in the midst of a strong revival not only
of state antitrust activity, 2 but also of scholarly inquiry into antitrust
history in general. While deepening our understanding of the growth of
federal antitrust law, these ongoing scholarly efforts also demonstrate
the considerable importance of state-level activity in the past, both in its
own right and as a powerful source of additional insight into federal law
developments.
This morning I would like to address four main points: first, the
evolving pattern of historical interpretation; second, the relevance of
antitrust history to current practice and thinking; third, the parallels
between recent, revitalized state efforts and the state developments of a
century ago; and fourth, the nature and significance of one particularly
important difference between early and modern antitrust analysis.
II. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP
Antitrust scholars and practitioners of otherwise widely differing views
long have shared a common interest in the historical origins, nature,
and development of American antitrust law, recognizing the central
* Professor, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). The Act became effective July 2, 1890.
2 See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 15, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: THE
ROLE OF STATE LAw 4-5; Abrams, Developments in State Antitrust Enforcement, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 989 (1987); Farmer, Introduction: Dual Enforcement of State and Federal Antitrust Laws,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 197 (1989); R. Stephan, Attorney General, Kansas, Remarks at the 23d
Annual New England Antitrust Conf.: Antitrust and a New Administration-Winds of
Change? 1 (1989).
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importance of this history as a guide to legislative intent and the meaning
of particular doctrinal developments. Currently, we are witnessing a
renewed outpouring of scholarship in this area by professional historians,
legal scholars, and economists. Collectively, this new work is greatly
expanding our knowledge of the practical and intellectual forces that
have shaped the action or inaction of legislatorsjudges, and enforcement
officials in the antitrust field over the last one hundred years.
Not surprisingly, scholars continue to focus heavily, although by no
means exclusively, on the formative antitrust era of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. This period, of course, produced not only
a series of foundational federal and state antitrust statutes, but also the
series of well-known, seminal antitrust cases that have been so greatly
influential in shaping antitrust thinking to the present day. As the body
of historical scholarship has grown and the concerns of antitrust scholars
and practitioners have shifted with changing economic and intellectual
climates, historical interpretations have changed as well. In his massive
3 See, e.g., M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW AND POLITICS (1988); Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 263 (1986); Carey, The Sherman
Act: What Did Congress Intend?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 337 (1989); Cheffins, The Development
of Competition Policy, 1890-1940: A Re-Evaluation of a Canadian and American Tradition, 27
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 449 (1989); Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, "Original
Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259 (1988); Hoven-
kamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REv. 105
(1989); Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1989) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes]; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982); May,
Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust
Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989) [hereinafter May, Antitrust in the Formative
Era]; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Concep-
tual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495 (1987) [hereinafter
May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure]; Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 1219 (1988); Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 511 (1989) [hereinafter Peritz, Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine]; Peritz, The "Rule
of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285
(1989) [hereinafter Peritz, The "Rule of Reason"]; Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984).
In recent months, this growing body of scholarship has been expanded still further by
the publication of an important law review symposium issue devoted to antitrust history.
See Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American Economy: Examining History
or Theorizing?, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1175 (1989); Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908-1914, 74
IOWA L. REv. 1151 (1989); Freyer, The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure,
and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880-1920, 74 IowA L. REv. 991 (1989);
Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-1933: An Early Phase of a Continuing Issue,
74 IOWA L. REv. 1067 (1989); Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1019 (1989) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Classical Theory of
Competition]; Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman
Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105 (1989).
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landmark work of the mid- 1950s, Hans Thorelli, for example, concluded
that the Sherman Act reflected a contemporary philosophy of "economic
egalitarianism" echoing various major currents of late nineteenth century
thinking.4 In Thorelli's view, Congress sought to promote both economic
opportunity and competition and was concerned not only with efficiency,
but also with wealth distribution and political freedom. While Thorelli
believed that consumers were the ultimate beneficiaries of the new anti-
trust act, he declared that Congress likely had small businesses in mind
as the intended immediate beneficiaries.6
In the 1970s, partly in reaction to the antitrust jurisprudence of the
Warren Court, Professor and later Judge Robert H. Bork, in another
landmark book,7 offered a quite different interpretation. Judge Bork
strongly de-emphasized the influence of general political and economic
theory in formative era antitrust thinking.' Simultaneously, he down-
played congressional concerns for small business opportunity and equita-
ble wealth distribution. 9 Instead, Judge Bork stressed an original con-
gressional concern for economic efficiency or "consumer welfare
maximization.'"0 He then invoked this historical view to promote an
antitrust approach premised on this single general goal." More recently,
numerous scholars have continued to examine the formative period and
have reemphasized early congressional concerns for opportunity and
distribution along with efficiency.' 2 At the same time, recent scholarship
increasingly has highlighted the centrality of contemporary economic
and political theory in early antitrust analysis and the pervasive late
nineteenth century concern for individual rights, in addition to consumer
welfare more narrowly defined.'
13  
-
4 See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 564-72 (1955).
' See id. at 225-30, 570-72.
6 See id. at 227.
7 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978) [hereinafter R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX].
B See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 553-56, 589-92 (discussing
this aspect of Judge Bork's work).
9 See R. BORK, supra note 7, at 56-66.
1o See id.
"See id. at 51, 57.
2 See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 3; Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, supra note 3, at
21-30; Lande, supra note 3; May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 258-300;
Millon, supra note 3; Peritz, The "Rule of Reason," supra note 3, at 291-313.
'3 See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 3; Hovenkamp, Classical Theoy of Competition, supra note
3; May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra
note 3, at 541-93; Millon, supra note 3; Peritz, The "Rule of Reason," supra note 3; Peritz,
Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, supra note 3.
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III. THE MODERN IMPORTANCE OF ANTITRUST HISTORY
Evolving understandings of antitrust history affect current activity and
analysis in a variety of ways. As the recent California Supreme Court
opinion in State ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. 14 dramatically demon-
strates, historical reinterpretation-particularly of formative era anti-
trust development-can at times have a very immediate and practical
consequence, directly determining the outcome of modern litigation and
rendering moot the resolution of other, more familiar issues of constitu-
tional or antitrust analysis. In that case, of course, the court decided that
California's Cartwright Act 5 did not extend to mergers.' 6 In doing so,
however, it found it unnecessary to engage in a long-anticipated preemp-
tion analysis.' 7 Instead, the court resolved the case through an extended
new examination of the history of state antitrust legislation and case law
as it had developed around the country by the time the Cartwright Act
was passed in 1907.18 On the basis of this record the court concluded that
the state legislature had not expected or intended that the key statutory
term "combination" would cover mergers.' 9 Accordingly, the court found
it needless to address the constitutional issues that might be posed by a
state challenge to a merger previously consented to by federal antitrust
enforcement authorities. 0
More generally, improved historical understanding clarifies the conti-
nuities and discontinuities between current antitrust developments and
those of earlier generations. This in turn can usefully contribute to the
further refinement of modern antitrust perspectives, which repeatedly
are justified or colored by modern interpretations of earlier develop-
ments.2 ' Such understanding also can help us to appreciate more fully
the place of antitrust law within the larger picture of twentieth century
American legal history.
Finally, a more adequate appreciation of antitrust history has consider-
able relevance for broader issues of modern legal methodology as well.
14 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 762 P.2d 385, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1988).
"5 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720 et seq. (West 1987).
16 See 46 Cal. 3d at 1153, 762 P.2d at 387, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
17 Id. at 1151, 762 P.2d at 386, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 222. For an extended discussion of the
constitutional issues raised by the case written when the case was still pending before
the state supreme court, see, for example, Oliver, Federal and State Antitrust Enforcement:
Constitutional Principles and Policy Considerations, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1245 (1988).
18 See 46 Cal. 3d. at 1153-63, 762 P.2d at 387-95, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 223-3 1.
19 Id. at 1163, 762 P.2d at 394-95, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31.
20 1d. at 1151, 762 P.2d at 386, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
21 See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 260, 298-99, 394-95 (discussing
this tendency).
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This is particularly true, for example, with regard to the current theoreti-
cal debates over original intent jurisprudence. Is antitrust law today a
good example of close adherence to original understanding? Or, alterna-
tively, does the history of antitrust law in the formative era and in the
years since indicate a substantial evolution over time and reveal important
differences between current understandings of the Sherman Act's gen-
eral language and the prevailing understanding of those same words one
hundred years ago? Such questions are likely to remain the subject of
considerable discussion for some time.2 This is particularly likely in
light of the orientation that modern scholars often have taken toward
constitutional and antitrust law, respectively. 23 Repeatedly, some of the
most eminent antitrust scholars of recent years have insisted strongly
upon a nonevolutionary, "original understanding" approach to constitu-
tional interpretation while firmly embracing an evolved, late twentieth
century, neoclassical interpretation of the Sherman Act itself.
24
IV. STATE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE LARGER PICTURE OF
ANTITRUST HISTORY
With these current trends of renewed state enforcement and expand-
ing historical understanding in mind, I would like to focus on certain
key similarities and differences between early and modern state activity
within the more general context of antitrust development over the course
of the Sherman Act's first one hundred years. We can usefully think of
state antitrust-related activity as falling roughly into four general periods:
first, the nineteenth century common law era; second, the vibrant late
nineteenth and early twentieth century "formative" period of active legis-
lative, executive, and judicial response to tremendously rapid and far-
reaching economic change; third, the comparatively quiescent period
from the close of the First World War to the 1970s; and fourth, the
recent and ongoing period of modern state antitrust revitalization.
Throughout these four periods, state legislation, enforcement, and
adjudication have expressed and addressed the changing intensity-
and the changing particulars-of prevailing local sentiments regarding
22 For recent discussions of antitrust history and its relevance for original intent or
original understanding approaches, see, for example, Flynn, supra note 3; May, Antitrust in
the Formative Era, supra note 3; Millon, supra note 3; and Peritz, The "Rule of Reason," supra
note 3.
21 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 3, at 1290-92.
24 Compare, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 5, 218 (1990) (declaring that any constitutional or statutory provision should be
interpreted and applied according to the meaning of the provision's wording as it was
generally understood at the time it was adopted) with R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra
note 7 (undertaking no examination of the meaning of "restraint of trade" within the
1990]
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anticompetitive, exclusionary, or monopolistic market behavior. State
efforts have fulfilled this general function in differing ways at differing
times, for the role of state as well as federal antitrust activity has been
defined in substantial part by the changing economic, intellectual, and
legal contexts in which state and federal actors have operated.
A. STATE ACTIVITY IN THE FORMATIVE AND MODERN ERAS
This impact of changing context is strikingly evident when one com-
pares developments in the two active periods of state enforcement-at
the beginning and at the end of the Sherman Act's first century, respec-
tively. To stress the differences between these two periods is not to deny,
of course, that there are important parallels between today's reinvigo-
rated state efforts and those of a century ago, even if current concerns
and initiatives frequently appear to be somewhat less dramatic versions
of their turn-of-the-century counterparts. In both periods, for example,
state antitrust activity expanded greatly.21 Significant state-level antitrust
efforts not only began prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in July
of 1890,26 they also remained a highly important part of the overall
pattern of Progressive Era antitrust activity up to the time of American
entry into the First World War.27 Moreover, in both the formative and
modern eras, state efforts intensified partly in response to the believed
inadequacy of federal enforcement efforts2 in the face of disturbing
broader contemporary context of late nineteenth century economic and political theory
and urging that modern Sherman Act analysis should be developed in accordance with
modern microeconomic thinking).
2 In response to increasing cartelization and concentration, at least a dozen states adopted
antitrust measures prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act, at least 27 had done so by
1900, and the number of states with new antitrust provisions reached at least 35 by 1915.
See, e.g., May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 499. In many states, legislators
turned to antitrust issues repeatedly and enacted a series of antitrust acts throughout the
formative era. See, e.g., May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 331-32, 337 &
n.655 (noting legislation in New York and Missouri). As noted below, this new legislation
laid the foundation for a substantial volume of contemporary public and private antitrust
litigation. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 500-03. Expanded state
enforcement since the 1970s similarly has been accompanied by a significant new wave of
antitrust legislation. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 15, supra note 2,
at 4-5.
26 See, e.g., 1-1. THORELLI, supra note 4, at 79-82, 155-57.
27 See S. PioTT, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF
BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST (1985); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at
331-91; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3; Pratt, The Petroleum Industry in
Transition: Anti-Trust and the Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil, 40J. ECON. HIST. 815 (1980).
28 On this factor during the formative era, see, for example, May, Antitrust in the Formative
Era, supra note 3, at 335. On this factor in more recent years, see, for example, Abrams,
supra note 2, at 990; Stephan, supra note 2, at 5, 7.
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contemporary currents of economic change-particularly, but not lim-
ited to, growing merger activity. 9
Many of the same forms of loose and tighter combinations and vertical
restraints that were targeted by state enforcers in the 1970s and 1980s
were also addressed in formative era state litigation. In addition, state
officials in both periods repeatedly challenged successfully not only small
enterprises and local conspiracies, but also major national corporations
and the local aspects of far-ranging interstate arrangements and activi-
ties. These state efforts in the Progressive Era, moreover, repeatedly
implicated basic issues of competition, efficiency, opportunity, wealth
distribution, and political freedom that in one form or another have
remained an important point of reference for diverse schools of antitrust
thinking down to the present day.3°
State antitrust supporters one hundred years ago, as well as in the
1970s and 1980s, repeatedly sought to reassert various older perspectives
and approaches while promoting important new substantive and proce-
dural innovations. State officials in the 1980s, for example, frequently
asserted sympathy for perspectives that were more prominent before the
Chicago School ascendancy of the Reagan years3' and invoked long-
established statutory provisions even while embracing new antitrust legis-
2 See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 4, at 63-96, 254-308 (on Progressive Era develop-
ments); Abrams, supra note 2, at 990 (on recent developments).
so On the focus, scope, and results of formative era state activity, see, for example, H.
THORELLI, supra note 4, at 155-57, 259-67; May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note
3, at 331-89; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3. On recent state efforts, see,
for example, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 15, supra note 2; W. HAYNES,JR.,
STATE ANTITRUST LAws (1989); Abrams, supra note 2; Lipnick & Gibbs, An Overview of the
Last Decade of State Antitrust Law, Including "Little FTC Acts," Unfair Trade Practice Legislation,
Franchise, and Business Opportunity Legislation, RICO and the Rejection of Illinois Brick, 6
TOLEDO L. REv. 929 (1985); Stephan, supra note 2.
like their modern counterparts, early state enforcers amassed a substantial number of
victories. Many more state than federal antitrust actions were brought in the first dozen
years following the passage of the Sherman Act, and a number of states continued active
enforcement activity for another decade or more. State remedies often were more substan-
tial than the relief obtained in many federal cases. In the years prior to the First World
War, active states repeatedly obtained judicial decrees of ouster against corporate antitrust
violators and garnered fines in individual state jurisdictions that were equivalent to or
greater than the total amount of fines collected in all federal antitrust cases in the same
period. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 500-02. At the same time,
private antitrust and restraint of trade litigation greatly increased in state courts in these
years and may have had as important an impact as public litigation in checking contempo-
rary cartel activity. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 4, at 265-66.
3' See, e.g., Barnes, Federal and State Philosophies in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 263 (1988); Stephan, supra note 2, at 6.
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lation, perspectives, and tactics at the same time." Formative era ap-
proaches similarly exhibited an often striking blend of older and newer
elements.
For example, as Professor Hovenkamp notes, the states in that earlier
period ultimately faced serious impediments to the effective use of state
corporate law as a weapon against mergers. Accordingly, as Professor
Hovenkamp observes, state corporate law increasingly was abandoned
for these purposes and emphasis instead was placed on antitrust legisla-
tion and analysis."3 Many states, however, did not abandon corporate law
as an antitrust tool altogether but instead adapted it to serve new antitrust
ends. For example, state legislators often made adherence to state anti-
trust law a prerequisite for retaining a corporate charter or intrastate
business privileges. 4 This innovative harnessing of older corporate law
powers effectively extended the regulatory reach of the states in dramatic
fashion. This was because contemporary case law, prior to the fuller
development of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, allowed
states to annul charters or revoke privileges in situations where the states
would not have been able to regulate disfavored conduct more directly. 3
Perhaps the most striking example of such an extension came in the
1909 Supreme Court case of Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.3 6 In that
case the United States Supreme Court held that the state of Arkansas
could fine a corporation for engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy not
alleged to have been formed, to have operated, or to have had any effect
within the state. The Court found that this was not an unconstitutional
attempt to assert extraterritorial power over activity in other states. In-
stead, it was deemed to be a legitimate state response to the intrastate act
of doing local business in violation of a state corporate law condition
limiting eligibility for intrastate activity. The relevant local condition for
intrastate privileges just happened to be nonparticipation in a price-
fixing conspiracy anywhere in the country.
3 7
Finally, throughout the last century, prevailing constitutional princi-
ples have established the boundaries for the permitted exercise of state
antitrust law and accordingly have been an important focus of attention
3 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 2; Brockmeyer, Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 215 (1989); Farmer, supra note 2; Lipnick & Gibbs, supra note 30;
Stephan, supra note 2.
33 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An Historical
Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75 (1990).
34 See J. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 213 (1916).
3' See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 510-14.
'6 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
37 See id. at 342-44.
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for parties interested in the possible application of such measures. Yet
in both the formative era and in the last two decades, constitutional case
law has left the states substantial room for antitrust enforcement and
experimentation.3 8
B. THE ALTERED CONTEXT OF FEDERAL AND STATE
ANTITRUST ACTIVITY
As previously noted, however, while there have been important conti-
nuities in both federal and state antitrust enforcement over the last one
hundred years, substantial changes in economic and intellectual context
since the time the Sherman Act was passed have produced major disconti-
nuities as well between the antitrust world of the formative era and our
own.39 Early antitrust law arose in a setting of tremendous economic and
political change.4 ° In the decades following the Civil War, an expanded
national transportation and communications network aided the geo-
graphic extension of markets. This, in turn, made it increasingly possible
for firms in a wide variety of fields to reap the benefits of the greater
economies of scale that resulted from the dramatic technological innova-
tions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While these devel-
opments produced very important new economic gains, they repeatedly
also posed severe problems of overproduction in many industries and
often led to a great intensification of competitive rivalry. In response to
such changes, contemporary American businesses widely sought protec-
tion, and more satisfactory returns, through various forms of loose or
tighter combination. 4' As cartelization and consolidation accelerated, and
as large-scale corporate capitalism increasingly replaced the more decen-
tralized, small business economy that had long been familiar to nine-
teenth century Americans,42 conflicts between business and labor also
intensified sharply.43
38 The constitutional law limits on state enforcement in the formative era are addressed
at length in J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION (1964) and in May,
Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3. For recent treatments of current constitutional
issues, see, for example, California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989) (rejecting
preemption challenge to state indirect purchaser laws); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONO-
GRAPH No. 15, supra note 2, at 9-30; W. HAYNES, JR., supra note 30, at 23-25; Hovenkamp,
State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375 (1983).
39 This section is based on the much more extended discussion of early federal and state
antitrust law recently set out in May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3. The points
noted here are developed in much more detail in that longer article.
40 See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 3; H. THORELLI, supra note 4, at 54-96, 235-308.
"' See, e.g., T. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 65-73 (1984); H. THORELLI, supra
note 4, at 63-85.
412 See M. SKLAR, supra note 3.
43 See, e.g., M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 188-91, 394-95 (1977).
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Americans viewing these major developments widely believed that they
posed fundamental questions about the future of American economic
and political life." Accordingly, it is not surprising that these changes
sparked a large and varied assortment of responses from late nineteenth
and early twentieth century Americans. Strongly held differences were
expressed, for example, by the proponents of such popular philosophies
as Spencerian Social Darwinism, the Protestant Social Gospel, Henry
George's "single tax" program, and various forms of Christian or Marxist
socialism, as well as by popular proponents of more traditional outlooks.
Simultaneously, within academic circles, prevailing classical economic
perspectives came under challenge first by the "new" school approaches
of the 1880s and then by the early stirrings of American neoclassicism,
which often heavily embraced traditional perspectives even while adding
to them in ways that would become increasingly important as time went
on.
45
In the midst of such diversity, however, contemporary social and eco-
nomic analyses repeatedly displayed striking commonalities as well.46
In particular, legislators, judges, and other Progressive Era Americans
strongly tended to develop and apply their varied approaches within
a widely shared general frame of reference that incorporated certain
fundamental perspectives on politics, economics, and judicial method-
ology.
Americans heavily influenced by the interrelated general themes of
classical economics and nineteenth century political liberalism commonly
believed that American economic and political life ultimately rested on
basic natural rights of labor, property, and exchange. When these rights
were duly safeguarded from illegitimate forms of interference, it was
thought, the operation of natural economic laws would tend to maximize
the benefits received by both individual citizens and society as a whole.
4' See, e.g., M. SKLAR, supra note 3, at 34.
4 On the diversity of American popular and academic responses to late nineteenth
and early twentieth century economic change, see, for example, R. BANNISTER, SOCIAL
DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1979); P. BOLLER,
AMERICAN THOUGHT IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, 1865-
1900 (1969); 3 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1949); S.
FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 1865-1901 (1956); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
(rev. ed. 1959); W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 54-77 (1965); E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); R. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 133-63 (1967); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra
note 3, at 281-82, 284-87; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 561-62.
46 See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 282-83, 284-87; May, Antitrust
Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at 562-71.
[Vol. 59
THE STATES AND THE SHERMAN ACT
The protection of free labor, or economic opportunity, promoted effi-
cient specialization of efforts and greater innovation. Protection of natu-
ral property rights in each individual's own labor or in the products of
that labor in turn laid the foundation for the related possibility and right
of free exchange. Free exchange made possible great increases in wealth.
Both parties to any freely-willed bargain, it was stressed, ended up better
off or else would not have participated in the exchange. Social wealth in
the aggregate grew as the number of such transactions increased, and
free exchanges greatly multiplied through expansion of the free labor
specialization and division of efforts already noted, which dramatically
boosted overall output, thereby laying the foundation for a maximum
number of exchange transactions.
47
Competition played a critical role in this general economic vision. The
prevailing labor theory of value posited that competition would tend to
produce long-run equilibrium prices proportional to direct and indirect
labor inputs. As a result, the operation of natural economic law power-
fully tended to foster not only efficiency and prosperity, but also fair
distribution and consequent social harmony.4 8
If, however, the state departed from its proper role as a neutral guard-
ian of these basic rights of labor, property, and exchange and, for exam-
ple, enacted discriminatory legislation favoring some groups at the ex-
pense of others, it would become a dangerous source of oppression and
economic decline. Such artificial, redistributive favoritism was widely
deemed to be at once politically offensive, morally objectionable, and
economically pernicious. Moreover, contemporary theorists warned that
such a distortion of the government's role inevitably would spur an
intergroup battle for control of the state itself, leading to the ultimate
destruction of liberal republican government. Accordingly, the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century doctrines of laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism sought to protect these basic interrelated rights of labor, prop-
erty, and exchange from governmental impropriety through an assert-
edly "nondiscretionary" application of the corresponding constitutional
principles of economic liberty, substantive due process, and liberty of
contract.
49
Today, we tend to view antitrust and constitutional law as very separate
and quite different fields of analysis.5 ° I would like to suggest, however,
11 For a more detailed statement and explanation of these theoretical tendencies, see
May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 269-71.
48 See id. at 271-74.
49 See id. at 262-69, 274-81.
" See, e.g., Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 555 (1986).
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that for a great many formative era Americans concerned about contem-
porary concentration and collusion, formative era antitrust law consti-
tuted the essential logical complement to laissez-faire constitutionalism.
While laissez-faire constitutionalism targeted the potential dangers aris-
ing from the most prominent governmental innovations of the time,
antitrust analysis addressed the potential dangers to these same basic
rights of labor, property, and exchange that were thought to be posed
by the most profoundly disturbing private innovations of the time."'
These general theoretical perspectives heavily, if not universally, in-
fluenced not only popular thought, but also legislative and judicial activity
throughout the formative era. As I recently suggested at length in an
article delineating these themes in much greater detail, evidence of the
power of this general political and economic orientation appears repeat-
edly throughout the congressional debates preceding passage of federal
antitrust legislation in 1890 and 1914.52 Current perspectives on competi-
tive pricing, efficiency, economic opportunity, and political freedom sub-
stantially reflect a dominant, late twentieth century, neoclassical para-
digm emphasizing allocative efficiency, consumers' surplus, marginal
cost, and marginal revenue. In the formative era, however, understand-
ing of these same general principles took form under the influence of a
distinctly different general vision emphasizing interconnected natural
rights of labor, property, and exchange and the labor theory of value.
The congressional debate commentary, indeed, repeatedly reveals a
strong and widespread congressional desire to reaffirm these traditional
economic and political principles at a time when major economic changes
increasingly threatened the older patterns of economic and political life
on which these perspectives were premised. The embrace of such views,
I believe, affected early congressional antitrust intentions in a highly
important way. Specifically, the continuing vitality of traditional general
theory powerfully encouraged a congressional belief that antitrust law
simultaneously could protect economic opportunity, efficiency, competi-
tion, fair distribution, and political liberty through a process of largely
nondiscretionary adjudication. 3
In the very different economic and intellectual climate of late twentieth
century America, no school of antitrust philosophy can or does accept
this optimistic antitrust vision in its most full-blown formative era form.
Today, antitrust analysts quite generally accept the need for tradeoff
"' For an extended development of this view, see May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra
note 3, at 258-88.
512 See id. at 288-300.
5s See id.
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choices emphasizing some of these goals and values over others.54 Yet it
is important to stress that the reason that the early congressional debates
paid so little attention to such tradeoff questions was not because con-
gressmen were ignorant of general economic theory. Instead, I believe
this absence of attention resulted largely because of the strong influence
of a traditional economic and political theory that powerfully declared
that in general no tradeoffs were necessary or desirable.
These nineteenth century economic and political perspectives influ-
enced greatly not only congressional deliberations, but also the seminal
Sherman Act jurisprudence of the Progressive Era. In their respective
approaches to antitrust analysis, Justice Rufus Peckham, Justice Edward
Douglass White, and Judge William Howard Taft all heavily emphasized
the importance of the traditional rights of economic opportunity, prop-
erty, and free exchange and the related ideal of "nondiscretionary"
adjudication.55 The nature and power of this general orientation ap-
peared perhaps most clearly in Taft's own 1914 book, The Anti-Trust Act
and the Supreme Court.56 In that work, Taft declared the Sherman Act to
be an exceptionally important measure that both protected and appropri-
ately qualified these basic economic rights while safeguarding political
freedom. Before turning to a discussion of the Supreme Court Sherman
Act cases themselves, Taft strongly reiterated the core tenets of late
nineteenth century liberal political and economic theory. He stressed
that these principles formed the essential context for understanding the
passage and application of the Sherman Act during the preceding quar-
ter century. In so doing, he took pains to note, moreover, that Sherman
Act jurisprudence had accordingly evolved within the same general con-
ceptual framework that was simultaneously embodied and reinforced in
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. 7
Formative era state legislation and adjudication similarly displayed the
substantial impact of contemporary economic and political philosophy.
Indeed, the record of early state developments, which is today the focus
of increasing scholarly attention, provides considerable new insight not
only into the history of state antitrust activity, but also into the broader
theoretical dimensions of federal antitrust developments as well.5
See id. at 391-95 (discussing the changes in economic and political theory since the First
World War, the current acceptance of the need for tradeoffs, and the policy implications of
these developments.)
55 For a detailed discussion, see id. at 300-09, 375-78.
56 W. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914).
57 See id. at 2-4, 27, 37-38, 41-47.
58 See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 309-91; May, Antitrust Practice
and Procedure, supra note 3, at 541-93.
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Consider, for example, the report of New York's famous Lexow Com-
mittee,59 whose hearings and recommendations spurred the 1897 adop-
tion of new antitrust legislation 60 that, with some modifications, would be
reenacted two years later as the Donnelly Act of 1899.61 In explaining
the need for new legislation, that well-known report62 systematically artic-
ulated and embraced the basic precepts of late nineteenth century theory
and employed those principles to assess the nature and significance of
recent "trust" activity.6 3Thus, for example, the Committee acknowledged
and stressed that "[tlhe right of contract coexists with and is incidental
to the right of liberty and property, and is recognized in the natural law
as the very foundation of human progress and development."6 The
Committee then went on to emphasize that new antitrust restrictions on
the formation and operation of "trusts" were consistent with these core
principles, noting that unlike an ordinary combination of capital, a "trust"
was "designed to and does operate against the natural law.,
65
One of the most striking examples of the influence of contemporary
economic theory appears in the record of antitrust development in Pro-
gressive Era Kentucky.66 In the early years of the twentieth century, the
highest court in Kentucky interpreted the state's antitrust law to ban
price-fixing only when the resulting prices deviated from the "real value"
of the good in question.67 While modern commentators sometimes have
thought that this formula was equivalent to a "reasonable price" test
for cartelization, s the Kentucky high court clearly and emphatically
explained that this was not the case.69 Instead, the "real value" formula
established a purportedly objective standard directly corresponding to
the "natural" or "normal" prices posited in nineteenth century economic
theory. Nineteenth century writers explained that natural prices were
'9 See JOINT COMM. OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE TRUSTS,
REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS (1897) [hereinafter LExow REPORT].
60 Act of May 7, 1897, ch. 383, 1897 N.Y. Laws 310.
6' Act of May 25, 1899, ch. 690, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514.
62 See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 4, at 354-55.
63 See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 3, at 332-36.
6 LEXOW REPORT, supra note 59, at 31.
65 Id. at 10.
6 For an extended examination, see May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 3, at
541-43, 547-88.
67 See Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703 (1909),
overruled in Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 849, 179 S.W. 1051, 1058 (1915); Owen County
Burley Tobacco Soc'y v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 151, 107 S.W. 710, 714 (1908).
68 See, e.g., R. BORE, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 7, at 75-77.
69 See Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 574-75, 115 S.W.
703, 711 (1909).
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the levels, equivalent to production cost, to which rates naturally tended
to be pushed by the unimpeded operation of competition.70 Accordingly,
Kentucky antitrust litigation under the "real value" test did not center
on subjective judge or jury assessments of "reasonableness." Instead,
these cases focused on the market conditions and costs prevailing at the
time that particular combinations had acted in an effort to establish
whether the defendant combinations had forced prices to deviate from




In this year marking the centennial of the enactment of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, it is fitting that we focus our attention increasingly on
aspects of antitrust history that repeatedly have been underemphasized
in many modern accounts of antitrust development. As we do so, our
expanding historical understanding of theory and practice likely will
affect current analysis and activity significantly and, in particular, is likely
to raise important new questions about the nature and possible limits of
original understanding methodologies in the antitrust field. Within this
broader current context of ongoing historical inquiry, state activity neces-
sarily must be a major focus, for as a substantial part of early and modern
practice, and as a source of illumination for antitrust history in general,
state activity has played and continues to play a quite important role.
70 See, e.g., J. CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTEREST AND
PROFITS 16-17, 77-79 (1899); F. WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 269-
70 (recast by A. Chapin 1878).
"' Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 577, 115 S.W. 703, 712
(1909). See American Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 153 S.W. 972
(1913), rev'd, 236 U.S. 660 (1915); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth,
148 Ky. 572, 147 S.W. 1199 (1912) (mem.), rev'd 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International
Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 795, 146 S.W. 12 (1912), rev'd, 234 U.S.
216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 564, 144 S.W.
1064 (1912), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Common-
wealth, 144 Ky. 403,138 S.W. 248 (1911); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Common-
wealth, 137 Ky. 668, 126 S.W. 352 (1910).
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